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Abstract—Recent studies have shown that deep learning models
are vulnerable to specifically crafted adversarial inputs that are
quasi-imperceptible to humans. In this letter, we propose a novel
method to detect adversarial inputs, by augmenting the main
classification network with multiple binary detectors (observer
networks) which take inputs from the hidden layers of the
original network (convolutional kernel outputs) and classify the
input as clean or adversarial. During inference, the detectors
are treated as a part of an ensemble network and the input
is deemed adversarial if at least half of the detectors classify
it as so. The proposed method addresses the trade-off between
accuracy of classification on clean and adversarial samples, as
the original classification network is not modified during the
detection process. The use of multiple observer networks makes
attacking the detection mechanism non-trivial even when the
attacker is aware of the victim classifier. We achieve a 99.5%
detection accuracy on the MNIST dataset and 97.5% on the
CIFAR-10 dataset using the Fast Gradient Sign Attack in a semi-
white box setup. The number of false positive detections is a mere
0.12% in the worst case scenario.
Index Terms—Adversarial attacks, artificial neural networks,
anomaly detection, machine learning, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has achieved state-of-the-art performance in
solving challenging problems such as image classification
[1], object detection [2], natural language processing [3], and
automated game playing [4]. However, adversarial examples
[5] have hindered the large scale deployment of deep learn-
ing models. Specifically, adversarial examples are perturbed
inputs, which are carefully crafted to induce high confidence
misclassification from well-trained deep learning models. The
subtle perturbations are imperceptible for a human, introducing
the adversarial aspect of these attacks. For image classifica-
tion, visual imperceptibility is achieved through constrained
optimization under an LP norm bound.
Notable properties of adversarial examples have been dis-
covered recently that make the problem worthwhile. Most
surprisingly, adversarial examples have been shown to transfer
from one network to another without knowledge of the target
model [5]. Real world examples of adversarial attacks have
been explored in [6] where the authors show that adversarial
images retain their properties after being printed physically, or
recaptured using a camera.
Current methods in adversarial defense research follow two
approaches: detection and classification. Most methods to
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classify adversarial examples employ deep learning techniques
that can be trained end-to-end [7], [8]. This approach has two
key challenges. First, the adversary may consider the defense
as a part of the model, which can be attacked in the same
way as the original model. Second, defenses that modify the
main classification network compromise its accuracy on clean
samples; this trade-off is well documented and hinders the
usage of a majority of proposed defenses against adversarial
attacks [9]. Detection based methods have shown promising
results, however, it has been shown that it is not easy to detect
adversarial samples simply using a single neural network
[10]. Thus, in our work, we aim to accurately detect attacks
by employing multiple observer networks that classify the
outputs from the hidden layers of the main network as clean
or adversarial. The use of more than one observer network
makes it non-trivial to attack the classification model, while
keeping the original network parameters unchanged. This
ensures accurate adversarial detection without compromising
accuracy on clean samples. Detecting adversarial samples can
be critical in systems such as self-driving vehicles, where
human intervention can be sought.
Adversarial perturbations are imperceptible at the input
level. However, Xie et al. [11] show that these perturbations
grow when propagated through a deep network and appear as
significant noise at the hidden layers’ feature maps. Motivated
by this fact, we augment the main network with multiple
binary classifiers to detect this amplified noise in the feature
maps. Each detector takes inputs from a different hidden layer
from the original classification network and classifies the input
as clean or adversarial. The parameters of the original
model remain unaffected, thus retaining accuracy on clean
samples. The ensemble of all detectors is used to determine
whether the input is clean or not. Most of the binary classifiers
rely on convolutional layers as they are ideal to model the large
number and dimensionality of feature maps. We note that the
observer neural networks are trained independently and do not
modify the parameters of the target classifier. This enables
detectors to be trained and plugged-in to off the shelf neural
networks. Thus, neural networks that are not mutable or have
parameters that are not publicly available can be protected.
Related Work: We present related studies here on non-
intrusive adversarial detection. Comparisons to these works
have been made in Section IV. Feinman et al. [12] model the
confidence of classifying adversarial samples by introducing
Bayesian uncertainty estimates, which are available in neural
networks that use dropout. These estimates can be captured
through the variance of the output vectors obtained from
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2different paths of the neural network when using dropout.
They observe that this variance is much higher for adversarial
inputs; this serves as a method of detection. Liang et al. [13]
treat adversarial perturbations as a form of noise. They use
scalar quantization and a smoothing spatial filter to denoise the
inputs. They compare classification results of the original and
denoised versions of the input to detect potential adversaries.
In another study, Wang et al. [14] observe that classification
results of adversarial inputs are much more sensitive to change
in the parameters of the deep neural network. They introduce
a metric to measure sensitivity and use a threshold value to
filter input samples. We note that the methods discussed so
far rely on capturing a pre-determined property, rather than
relying on a machine learning model to detect anomalies.
This often leads to sub-par detection performance due to
generalization errors resulting from strong assumptions on
data generation. Other signal processing techniques such as
random sampling and uncertainty estimation have also led to
promising results in non-intrusive adversarial input detection.
[15] and [16] introduce a promising randomized approach
for selective sampling from the hidden layers that aims at
minimizing uncertainty in output classification. It is interesting
to investigate in future work the combination of the key idea
behind the proposed architectures and ensemble strategy with
the sampling strategy proposed in [16].
The work of Metzen et al. [17] is most similar to our
proposed approach. They train one auxiliary detector network
that takes input from an internal layer of the deep neural
network and classifies the input as clean or adversarial.
The authors make several attempts to optimize the size and
placement of the single detector in order to achieve optimal
detection accuracy. Although circumventing such a detection
algorithm is non-trivial, Carlini and Wagner [10] show that
it is possible in a defense blind case. Contrary to this work,
we train multiple detectors to take input from and classify
feature maps of all intermediate layers. We show that each
hidden layer output is meaningful in discriminating the input
samples. This is because of the diverse nature of adversarial
noise present in the hidden layer outputs. Thus, using multiple
networks to detect adversaries allows each network to classify
results based on different types of perturbations found in the
feature maps. These results are combined into an ensemble to
achieve state-of-the-art detection accuracy.
We achieve an average detection accuracy of 92.74% and
90.53% for two popular datasets across four popular attacks
in the adversarial machine learning field, outperforming pre-
viously proposed detection algorithms on the same datasets.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A. Datasets and Classifiers
Our evaluations are conducted using two popular datasets:
The MNIST dataset of handwritten digits [18] and the CIFAR-
10 dataset [19]. MNIST consists of 60000 training images and
10000 test images with a dimension of 28× 28, belonging to
10 classes (corresponding to the digits). The CIFAR-10 dataset
consists of 50000 training images and 10000 test images with
dimension 32×32×3, belonging to 10 classes (dog, cat, frog,
horse, deer, aeroplane, truck, ship, automobile, bird).
A popular ResNet-18 [1] network is selected as a target clas-
sifier for both datasets. This is a deep 18 layer convolutional
neural network that achieves a baseline classification accuracy
of 93.02% on CIFAR-10 and 99.00% on MNIST.
B. Threat model
There are three popular threat models in adversarial machine
learning as described by Carlini and Wagner [10]:
• A zero knowledge or black box attacker who is not
aware of the model architecture, model parameters, or
the defense in place.
• A perfect knowledge or white box attacker who is aware
of the model architecture and parameters and also aware
of the parameters and type of defense in place.
• A limited knowledge or semi-white box attacker who is
aware of either the model or defense.
We consider a realistic semi-white box threat model where
the attacker has perfect knowledge of the weights of the model
and the architecture, but not of the defense.
C. Attacks
We evaluate our defense on four popular attacks: Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) [20], Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) [21], DeepFool [22], and the Carlini & Wagner L2
attack (CW2) [23]. We use x to denote the clean input image,
y for the ground truth label, θ for the network parameters, and
x∗ for the constructed adversarial sample.
FGSM is a fast one step gradient descent with respect to
the input image. The formulation of adversarial samples is:
x∗ = x+  · sign(∆xJ(θ, x, y)), (1)
where  is the maximum allowed perturbation under an L∞
norm and J is the loss function of the classifier. We conduct
experiments using  = 0.2.
PGD can be a much stronger attack as it tolerates a higher
computational cost. FGSM is performed iteratively, and the
optimization step for the kth iteration is given by:
x∗k = clip(x
∗
k−1 + κ · sign(∆xJ(θ, x∗k−1, y))), (2)
where x∗k−1 is the output of the previous iteration, and x
∗
0 =
x. We conduct experiments using κ = 0.1,  = 0.2 and 100
iterations. The ‘clip’ function is used to clip the pixel value if
the change exceeds the maximum allowed perturbation, .
DeepFool is an iterative attack, that finds the closest hy-
perplane approximation of a decision boundary to x, and then
pushes x - in a perpendicular fashion - towards misclassifica-
tion at the other side with minimal perturbation.
CW2 solves the following optimization problem to find x∗:
min
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣σ(w)− x∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+ c · h
(
σ(w)
)
, (3)
where h is given by:
h = max({Z(σ(w))i − Z(σ(w))t, 0), i 6= t, (4)
where t and Z(.) are the true label and softmax logit vector.
3Fig. 1. Defense Architecture. The boxes on the top indicate the main network (ResNet-18 [1]) used for image classification. The Conv block is a 7 × 7
kernel convolutional layer which is followed by 4 residual blocks (Res1, Res2, Res3, Res4). The 4 detectors (D1, D2, D3, D4) are neural networks for binary
classification. They take intermediate inputs from the main network and classify the input as adversarial or clean.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We augment the main network with multiple detector ob-
server networks. These networks take inputs from hidden
layers of the main network (feature maps) and perform binary
classification on these feature maps to determine whether the
original input is adversarial or clean. In the considered setup,
the main network is the ResNet-18 architecture that has been
pre-trained1 for image classification [1]. The parameters of the
main network are frozen in order to start training the detectors.
We place four detector networks that are trained independently.
Similar to the main network, the detectors are also deep
neural networks that end with fully connected layers down to
two output classes (adversarial or clean). The architecture of
each detector is derived from the base classification network.
During training, adversarial images for the entire training set
are simulated for each attack being tested. During inference,
the four detectors are treated as an ensemble model and the
input is deemed adversarial if two or more detectors classify
it as so. The ensemble is meaningful because each detector
learns from a different layer’s feature map. This is verified by
observing that the ensemble prediction of all four detectors
yields a superior detection accuracy than any strict subset.
The ResNet-18 main network has the following architecture:
Input ⇒ Conv ⇒ Res1 ⇒ Res2 ⇒ Res3 ⇒ Res4 ⇒ FC.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, ResN is the N th residual
block [1] and FC is the fully connected layer that gives a
10 × 1 output vector. Conv is a 7 × 7 stride 2 convolution
with 64 kernels. Each residual block is made up of 2 3 × 3
convolutions each followed by batch normalization and ReLU
activation. The architectures of the detectors are given by:
D1 : Res2⇒ Res3⇒ Res4⇒ FC ⇒ FC ′,
D2 : Res3⇒ Res4⇒ FC ⇒ FC ′,
D3 : Res4⇒ FC ⇒ FC ′,
D4 : FC ⇒ FC ′.
(5)
Here, FC ′ is a fully connected layer that goes from 10 to 2
neurons. The detectors are trained using the Adam Optimizer
1Training details: https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar
[24] with a learning rate of 0.01, batch size of 256 and a weight
decay of 10−5. To the best of our knowledge, this architecture
is unique and novel. The detector networks are derived from
splitting the main classification network in various layers.
Reusing the architecture in this manner leads to promising
results, as shown in the next section. The bounds of the
adversarial perturbations used throughout the experiments ( =
0.2, κ = 0.1) are chosen based on studies performed by similar
works and results we compare to. These bounds are also low so
as to make the generated adversarial examples imperceptible.
Further, the bounds are kept constant throughout the training
and testing time. As the adversarial examples are generated
during training, the detectors are trained on the specific attack
that the classifier is trying to defend against. Transferability of
the proposed detection mechanism to different attacks unseen
during training is left for future work.
IV. RESULTS
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our defense by measur-
ing the accuracy of detection among adversarial samples (i.e.,
the percentage of adversarial samples that were successfully
detected). We also measure the number of false positives
(i.e., the number of clean images that were classified as
adversarial). Across the four attacks and two datasets used,
the classification accuracy post-attack (undefended network)
ranged from 14% to 22%. Tables I and II summarize the results
of adversarial detection obtained across all testing scenarios.
The columns D1, D2, D3, and D4 give the accuracies of the
individual binary detectors. The ensemble column gives the
total detection accuracy of the defense2.
A. Results on MNIST
We achieve a detection accuracy of 99.5% using FGSM
and 89.1% on the CW2 attack. The complete results for
the attacks are shown in Table 1. False positives rates were
0.12%, 0.08%, 0.09% and 0.07% for FGSM, PGD, CW2 and
2Code accepted for publication at:
https://codeocean.com/capsule/3959338/tree/v1
4TABLE I
DETECTION ACCURACY ON THE MNIST DATASET (%)
Attack D1 D2 D3 D4 Ensemble
FGSM 91.2 95.8 95.0 98.0 99.5
PGD 82.0 84.0 84.0 87.4 91.0
CW2 82.5 86.0 85.8 86.6 89.1
Deepfool 83.1 82.5 86.0 88.5 91.4
TABLE II
DETECTION ACCURACY ON THE CIFAR-10 DATASET (%)
Attack D1 D2 D3 D4 Ensemble
FGSM 89.0 94.4 94.0 95.5 97.5
PGD 69.5 78.9 82.0 82.4 85.4
CW2 65.5 73.0 77.0 80.1 85.0
Deepfool 72.1 84.5 84.5 87.9 94.2
DeepFool, respectively. [12] achieves an accuracy of 92.2%
and [13] achieves an accuracy of 93.86% for detecting the
FGSM attack. [14] achieves an accuracy of 97.67% accuracy
for FGSM and 94.00% accuracy for CW2. The accuracies
obtained in our experiments are superior in all but one case
to these values. The reason for the lower detection accuracy
compared to [14] on CW2 is left for future work.
B. Results on CIFAR-10
As shown in Table II, we achieve a detection accuracy of
97.5% using FGSM and 85.0% using CW2. False positive
rates were 0.06%, 0.02%, 0.03% and 0.02% for FGSM, PGD,
CW2 and DeepFool, respectively. [12] achieves an accuracy of
74.7% and [17] achieves an accuracy of 84.00% for detecting
the FGSM attack. [14] achieves an accuracy of 91.00% ac-
curacy for FGSM and 83.00% accuracy for CW2. We obtain
better accuracies than these present methods of detection.
C. False Positives
Many present methods of adversarial defenses are rendered
unusable due to their drop in accuracy on clean samples [9].
We address this trade-off by keeping the original classification
network unchanged. For all testing scenarios, we observe the
number of clean testing samples in MNIST and CIFAR-10 that
were classified as adversarial. In the worst case scenario, there
were a total of 12 clean images classified as adversarial (false
positive rate of 0.12%). These results validate our hypothesis
of minimal loss in accuracy on clean samples.
D. Ablation Study
To assess the impact of each detector on the final detection
accuracy, several experiments were performed. Tables I and
II give the accuracy of detection for each individual detector
as well as the ensemble when using all four detectors for
MNIST and CIFAR-10. The ensemble accuracy is consistently
higher than that of any individual detector and this shows the
effectiveness of the ensemble result. Experiments were also
conducted to verify the need for multiple detectors. Ensemble
accuracies were calculated using two subsets of the four
detectors: D1 + D4 (peripheral: closer to input and output) and
D2 + D3 (middle: farther from the input/output). In these cases
TABLE III
ENSEMBLING COMBINATIONS (%)
Attack Dataset D1 + D4 D2 + D3 Ensemble
FGSM MNIST 98.5 97.5 99.5
PGD MNIST 88.5 90.4 91.0
CW2 MNIST 87.1 87.5 89.1
Deepfool MNIST 87.8 90.0 91.4
FGSM CIFAR-10 96.5 96.0 97.5
PGD CIFAR-10 81.4 83.5 85.4
CW2 CIFAR-10 81.3 82.5 85.0
Deepfool CIFAR-10 88.5 92.2 94.2
This table shows the accuracy of detection for 2 different combinations of
ensembling the detectors. Combination D1 + D4 is of the peripheral detectors
and the combination D2 + D3 is of the middle detectors. The number of false
positives (FP) is given over testing on 10000 images. Here, the false positives
are calculated over ensembling all 4 detectors.
of two detectors, the input is considered adversarial when both
detectors classify it as so. Table III shows the accuracy of de-
tection under these scenarios. The inferior accuracy compared
to the ensemble of all four detectors demonstrates the need
for each detector. This strongly suggests that each detector
learns new discriminative features about the adversarial image
from the output of various hidden layers. Results using other
combinations of D1 through D4 are provided in the Appendix.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our defense does not incorporate any baseline defense such
as adversarial training [20]. Adversarial training is a widely
used defense, which trains the classifier using adversarial
samples and their corresponding corrected labels. Detection
methods commonly employ this technique and build a defense
on top of it. However, this is not useful for our detection based
method, because we seek to retain discriminative properties
of adversarial and clean samples. This means that adversarial
training modifies the parameters of the network to improve
classification of adversarial samples, which in turn reduces the
differences between outputs of hidden layers for adversarial
and clean inputs and thus, making them harder to detect.
The observer networks that we employ in our method of
defense have two main properties that make it effective: non-
intrusiveness and diversity. The non-intrusive aspect of the
detection is that the observer networks employed are trained
independently from the original classifier. Thus, the weights
and gradients of the observer networks differ from those of
the main network. The non-intrusive nature of our proposed
detection mechanism allows for simple deployment on existing
models. The diversity aspect of detection is that we use
multiple observer networks for detection of an adversary. This
allows us to take inputs from various layers of the neural
network and classify them. These inputs (feature maps) are
different from each other (diverse) and enable different bases
of classifying the input as adversarial or clean.
We achieve state-of-the-art detection results on the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets against powerful iterative attacks such
as PGD and CW2. However, application of this defense on
datasets of higher resolution using larger network architectures
is open for further study. In particular, we anticipate exploring
the scalability of our defense to deeper models.
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APPENDIX
OTHER DETECTOR COMBINATIONS
Table I shows the accuracies of using an ensemble of two
other combinations of detectors D1 through D4 than the ones
mentioned in the main text. In the case of D2 to D4, three
detectors D2 + D3 + D4 are used for the ensemble and the
majority classification result is selected (clean or adversarial).
ADVERSARIAL NOISE PROPAGATION
Figure 1 demonstrates the propagation and amplification
of adversarial perturbations through the considered ResNet-18
network. The images on the top from left to right are that of
a clean and adversarial 3, randomly selected from the MNIST
dataset. The adversarial image is generated using PGD with 
= 0.2. The images on the bottom are that of their respective
feature maps obtained from the output of the Res1 layer. It
can be clearly seen that the feature map of the adversarial 3
is significantly noisier than the clean 3. This motivates our
approach of detection by filtering out input images with noisy
feature maps in the main classification network.
